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Abstract. Role-based access control (RBAC) and attribute-based ac-
cess control (ABAC) are currently the most prominent access control
models. However, they both suffer from limitations and have features
complimentary to each other. Due to this fact, integration of RBAC and
ABAC has become a hot area of research recently. We propose an access
control model that combines the two models in a novel way in order to
unify their benefits. Our approach provides a fine-grained access control
mechanism that takes into account the current contextual information
while making the access control decisions.
Keywords: Context-aware access control, RBAC, Attributes, Role-permission
explosion
1 Introduction
RBAC [6] is the most popular access control model and has been a focus of
research since last two decades. The RBAC paradigm encapsulates privileges
into roles, and users are assigned to roles to acquire privileges, which makes it
simple and facilitates reviewing permissions assigned to a user. It also makes
the task of policy administration less cumbersome, as every change in a role is
immediately reflected on the permissions available to users assigned to that role.
With the advent of pervasive systems, authorization control has become com-
plex as access decisions may depend on the context in which access requests are
made. The contextual information represents a measurable contextual primitive
and may entail such information being associated with a user, object and envi-
ronment. It has been recognized that RBAC is not adequate for situations where
contextual attributes are required parameters in granting access to a user [12].
Another limitation of RBAC is that the permissions are specified in terms of ob-
ject identifiers, referring to individual objects. This is not adequate in situations
where a large number of objects in hundreds of thousands exist and leads to
role-permission explosion problem.
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) [17] has been identified to overcome
these limitations of RBAC [5]. ABAC is considered more flexible as compared to
RBAC, since it can easily accommodate contextual attributes as access control
parameters [12]. However, ABAC is typically much more complex than RBAC
in terms of policy review, hence analyzing the policy and reviewing or changing
user permissions are quite cumbersome tasks. As discussed above, both RBAC
and ABAC have their particular advantages and disadvantages. Both have fea-
tures complimentary to each other, and thus integrating RBAC and ABAC has
become an important research topic [5], [10], [9]. Recently, NIST announced an
initiative to integrate RBAC and its various extensions with ABAC in order to
combine the advantages offered by both RBAC and ABAC. We take a step in
this direction and present the idea of an integrated RBAC and ABAC access con-
trol model, called the Attributes Enhanced Role-Based Access Control model.
The proposed model retains the flexibility offered by ABAC, yet it maintains
RBAC’s advantages of easier administration, policy analysis and review of user
permissions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes related
work and compares our approach to prior work. In Section 3, we present the
components of the proposed access control model and how access control de-
cisions may be calculated. Section 4 discusses potential benefits offered by the
proposed approach and identifies future directions.
2 Related Work
The limitations of RBAC led to announcement of the NIST initiative to incor-
porate attributes into roles [12]. The initiative identified three possible ways in
which roles and attributes may be combined. The first option is dynamic roles,
where attributes determine the roles to be activated for a user. Al-Kahtani et al
[1] and Kern et al [14] explored this option for automated user-role assignment,
in large organizations, using attribute-based rules. These solutions consider only
user attributes and do not address the issues of role explosion and role-permission
explosion. In the second approach, roles and attributes may be combined in an
attribute-centric manner. The roles are not associated to permissions; rather
they are treated as just one of many attributes. This approach is essentially the
same as ABAC and does not inherit any benefit from RBAC. In the third ap-
proach, called role-centric, roles determine the maximum permissions available
to a user, and attributes are used to constrain these permissions. Kuhn et al [12]
identify this approach as a direction for future research, since it may retain the
advantages of RBAC while adding the much needed flexibility.
In response to the above initiative, Jin et al [10] present first formal ac-
cess control model called RABAC using the role-centric approach. They extend
RBAC with user and object attributes and add a component called permission
filtering policy (PFP). The PFP requires specification of filtering functions in the
form of Boolean expression consisting of user and object attributes. Their solu-
tion is useful to address the role-explosion problem and as a result facilitates user
role assignment. However, the approach does not incorporate environment at-
tributes and is not suitable for systems involving frequently changing attributes,
e.g., location and time. Also, we make a fundamental modification in RBAC by
using attributes of the objects in the permissions, addressing the issue of role-
permission explosion. Huang et al [9] present a framework to integrate RBAC
with attributes. The approach consists of two levels: underground and above-
ground. The underground level makes use of attribute-based policies to automate
the processes of user-role and role-permission assignment. The aboveground level
is the RBAC model, with addition of environment attributes, constructed using
attribute-based policies. Their work is different than ours in that it focuses on
automated construction of RBAC.
Several efforts have been reported which extend RBAC to include the con-
text of access. Examples include: environment roles [2], spatio-temporal RBAC
[16], context-aware RBAC [13] and others. They add context into RBAC, how-
ever these extensions typically require creation of a large number of closely re-
lated roles, causing the role-explosion problem. Ge et al [8], and Giuri et al
[7] focus on resolving the issue of role explosion by providing the mechanism
of parametrized privileges and parametrized roles. However, the permissions in
these solutions refer to objects using their identifiers. Few approaches propose
a variant of RBAC categorizing the objects into groups or types in an attempt
to resolve the role-permission explosion issue [15], [3], [11]. Grouping the objects
allows us to associate a single attribute with each object. The permissions are
then specified using the group attribute, where each permission refers to a set
of objects in that group. Moreover, as the number of object attributes grow, the
number of groups (referred to as views in [11] and object classes in [3]) increase
exponentially. This makes task of policy administration complex since for every
new object to be added in the system it has to be associated with all those
groups to which it belongs.
3 Components of the Proposed Model
This section presents the components of the proposed Attributes Enhanced Role-
Based Access Control (AERBAC) model. We also discuss briefly how an access
request may be evaluated. Figure 1 depicts our access control model and its
components. The entities users, roles, objects and operations have the same
semantics as in RBAC. Users and objects in our model are associated with
attributes too. We also incorporate the environment attribute to fully capture the
situation in which access needs to be authorized. Below, we first describe these
attributes and then discuss semantics of the components in our access control
model, including permissions, conditions, sessions and request evaluation.
Attributes: Attributes capture the properties of specific entities (e.g. user).
We define an attribute function for each attribute that returns the value of
that attribute. Each attribute is represented by a range of finite sets of atomic
values. For example, the range of branch attribute is a set of names of branches
semantically relevant for the application domain.
User attributes capture the properties of the user who initiates an access




























Fig. 1. Attributes extended role-based access control model
clearance etc. Object attributes are used to define the properties of the resources
protected by the access control policy. Examples of object attributes include
type, status, location, time of object creation etc. Environment attributes capture
external factors of the situation in which the access takes place. Temperature,
occurrence of an incident, system mode or other information which not only
pertains to a specific object or user, but may hold for multiple entities, are
typically modelled as environment attributes.
An attribute may be either static or dynamic. The values of static attributes
rarely change e.g. designation, department, type etc. On the other hand, dynamic
attribute values may change frequently and unpredictably, so they may well
change during the lifetime of a session. This means that they may need to be
checked more frequently, depending on the application requirements. Examples
of such attributes include officer in command, location, occurrence of an incident
etc. They are also referred to as contextual attributes in the literature [4].
Permissions and conditions: Our aim is to provide a dynamic, yet easy to
manage and efficient solution to enforce the access control model. In our model,
we achieve this by incorporating attributes associated with user, objects and en-
vironment in the permission. In contrast to the traditional approaches in RBAC,
the permissions in AERBAC refer to objects indirectly, using their attributes,
so a permission grants access to a set of objects having those attributes rather
than a single object. A permission refers to a set of objects sharing common
attributes, e.g. type or branch, using a single permission, in contrast to separate
permissions for each unique object. This is particularly relevant in those domains
where several objects share common attribute values. This helps in significantly
reducing the number of permissions associated with a role, while increasing the
expressiveness and granularity of access control in a role-centric fashion.
A permission consists of an object expression and an authorized operation
on the object set denoted by the expression. Object expressions are formed
using the attributes of objects. Each permission is associated with one or more
conditions, which must be evaluated to be true in order for the user to exercise
that permission. A condition associated with a permission may contain attributes
of the users, objects and environment. When a user requests a specific permission,
it is granted to the user if the permission exists in the user’s session and the
associated condition is satisfied, i.e. the current values of attributes match the
constraints given by the condition.
An example of a permission is: p= ( (oType(o) = secret oStatus(o) = active),
read) which states that a role having this permission can perform read operation
on the objects denoted by the given object expression. Here oType and oStatus
are object attribute functions that return the values of respective attributes for
a given object. Suppose that the permission p is constrained by a condition c=
(uMember(u) = premium ∧ time of day() ≤ uDutyExpire(u)) where uMember
and uDutyExpire are user attribute functions that return the attribute values of
a given user, whereas time of day() is an environment attribute function. This
condition implies that, in order to be granted the permission p, the user must be
a premium user and time of access must be before the end of user’s duty timing.
Session: A session contains a list of permissions associated with the roles
activated by the user. As described earlier, the permissions are different from
standard RBAC permissions in terms of referring to the objects using their
attributes and being tied with the conditions that are evaluated every time a
permission is to be exercised. Hence, the CheckAccess function needs to be re-
defined.
The Context Manager is responsible for propagating the updated values of
dynamic attributes of the users, objects and environment. Depending on the
application, some of these attribute values may also be provided by the user while
placing an access request, however the application must ensure the authenticity
of such information before using it.
3.1 Access Decisions
The main role of the access control mechanism is to verify whether a user u,
requesting access to object o, using an operation op, is authorized to do so. An
important consideration, in environments motivating the proposed approach, is
that the user’s request may also be based on the attributes of the objects. For
instance, in a medical imaging application, a user might want to view all images
containing specified characteristics e.g., objects with type = tumor and domain
= hospital-nw. The permissions in AERBAC are constrained by conditions. For
a user request to be granted, there must exist an object expression in the user’s
session that denotes the requested objects, and the condition tied to that object
expression must be evaluated to be true, as illustrated in Fig. 2.
Request Evaluation: As mentioned above, a user request can either explic-
itly specify an object, by listing its identifier, or can implicitly denote a set of
objects using the attributes of the objects. If the user request is not for a specific
object but rather a set of objects, the system must consider the given criteria to
return the requested objects. Once a user submits an access request, the request
must be evaluated against the policy. The function checkAccess in RBAC needs






















Fig. 2. Access request evaluation
as per the format of a given request, and returns the result. In the following, we
elaborate on evaluation of both identifier-based and attribute-based requests.
a) Identifier-based request: In identifier-based request, the user specifies
the identifier of the object to be accessed. The evaluation of such type of request
is straight-forward. In this case, the input of the function checkAccess consists of
a session se, an operation m, and an object obj. Recall that a permission consists
of an object expression and an operation and is constrained by a condition. The
checkAccess function returns true if and only if i) there exists a permission p, in
the available session permissions in session se, that contains an object expression
which evaluates to true for obj, ii) m matches op, and iii) the corresponding
condition c evaluates to true.
b) Attribute-based request: Using the second form of request, the user
may specify the attributes of the object in his/her request, rather than a unique
identifier of the object. Specifying the object attributes in the request implies
that the user wishes to access all those objects which have the specified attribute
values. In this approach, an example user request could be: Req = <se, (otype =
secret ∧ odept = admin ∧ ostatus = inactive), write> which states that the owner
of the session se wishes to exercise the write operation on the objects denoted by
the given object expression. The checkAccess function receives as input the access
request Req and returns the authorized objects to the user, if request is granted,
otherwise the request is denied. The given expression is converted to a query
and the resulting objects are retrieved from the resource database. The object
expressions existing in the user’s session are evaluated against each retrieved
object and if an object expression and its corresponding condition evaluate to
true for an object, the object is added into the list of authorized objects to be
granted to the user. Finally, the user is granted access to all those objects for
which an object expression and its corresponding condition return true. Since
the object expressions are to be evaluated for each returned object, this approach
may prove to be expensive in cases where several objects are returned by the
query formed based on user’s request. We plan to work further on it and propose
a more efficient algorithm to process such a request.
4 Discussion And Future Work
Our motivation to integrate RBAC with attributes is to obtain advantages asso-
ciated with both RBAC and ABAC, while addressing the limitations of RBAC
and ABAC. In a pure ABAC approach, when a user request needs to be eval-
uated, the relevant rules are identified using the attributes associated with re-
questing user, requested object and current environment. These shortlisted rules
are then evaluated one-by-one unless we find a rule which allows the request.
In contrast, our approach requires evaluation of only those object expressions
which are associated with the roles activated by a user in his/her session. Note
that this would significantly reduce the number of rules to be evaluated. Com-
pared to ABAC, our approach provides a systematic mechanism to evaluate a
subset of policy rules which are determined based on the user’s roles, yet retain-
ing the advantages offered by RBAC including quick assignment and revocation
of roles to users, reviewing of permissions assigned to a user or role, and re-
duced complexity of administration in large organizations. Our approach also
provides significant advantages when compared to RBAC. First, RBAC requires
that the permissions must refer to the objects based on their identity, which may
lead to role-permission explosion issue in applications involving large number of
objects. Our model allows to use object attributes in the permissions. Second,
RBAC cannot easily handle dynamically changing attributes [5]. It typically does
not support making contextual decisions unless many similar roles are created
causing role-explosion problem. We provide a mechanism to incorporate these
dynamically changing attributes in a role-centric manner, yet without requiring
creation of a large number of roles.
The model we proposed integrates RBAC and ABAC bringing together the
features offered by both models. In our model, the attributes may be associ-
ated with users, objects and environment allowing the request context to be
considered in making access control decisions. In the future, we plan to work
on formally defining the proposed model and provide a deeper analysis of mer-
its offered by the proposed model as compared to existing access control model
including ABAC and RBAC. Moreover, we aim to extend the model with con-
tinuous enforcement to deactivate a role or revoke a permission when context
conditions fail to hold, and to develop an XACML profile of the proposed model.
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